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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A review of the past two years’ cases involving confessions, searches, and 
seizures reveals important developments made by the United States Supreme 
Court. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals also decided a number of cases in 
these areas, which largely served to clarify existing law. This article reviews the 
most significant cases decided during the two-year survey period regarding (1) 
confessions and (2) searches and seizures. Each part identifies the areas of 
confession and search-and-seizure law that the recently decided cases implicate, 
discusses the courts’ opinions in those cases, and analyzes the cases’ significance 
to the law of Texas and the United States. 
II.  CONFESSIONS 
The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, made applicable to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment,1 provides that “[n]o person . . . shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”2 Procedural 
safeguards under both the federal and the Texas Constitution protect this right. 
Perhaps chief among them, originating in Miranda v. Arizona,3 is the 
requirement that authorities inform suspects of their right to remain silent and 
their right to counsel prior to custodial interrogation.4 Other facets of the Fifth 
Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination prohibit the State from 
commenting on a defendant’s refusal to testify at trial,5 insulate probationers 
from compelled self-incrimination,6 and govern the circumstances under which 
a suspect may claim Fifth Amendment protections prior to trial.7 
A.  CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION 
As noted above, the Constitution forbids compelling a suspect to incriminate 
himself.8 To safeguard this right, the Supreme Court has articulated that before 
a suspect is subjected to custodial interrogation, the suspect must be informed of 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964)(incorporating the 
privilege against self-incrimination). 
 2. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 3. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 4. Id. at 467–70. 
 5. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965). 
 6. See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426 (1984); Chapman v. State, 115 S.W.3d 1, 5–
6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). 
 7. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 427; see also United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Comm’r of Immigration, 
273 U.S. 103, 113 (1927). 
 8. See supra notes 1–2. 
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his right to remain silent, that anything he says can and will be used against him 
in a court of law, of the right to an attorney and to have an attorney present 
during interrogation, and of the right to have an attorney appointed if he is 
unable to personally afford one.9 Texas has codified these warnings as Texas 
Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.22.10 If law enforcement fails to properly 
admonish a suspect regarding these rights, any confession obtained in a 
contemporaneous interrogation is inadmissible in court.11 
1.  Bobby v. Dixon 
In Bobby v. Dixon,12 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Sixth Circuit Court 
of Appeals erred in granting Dixon habeas corpus relief under the Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) because the Ohio Supreme Court’s 
decision to allow the admission of Dixon’s confession was not clear error as 
required for relief under the Act.13 
Archie Dixon and Tim Hoffner murdered Chris Hammer and stole his car.14 
Dixon then used Hammer’s identification to sell the car and forged Hammer’s 
name on the check he received in payment.15 Investigating officers suspected 
Dixon’s involvement and questioned him in a non-custodial setting about the 
murder, but Dixon refused to answer any questions without the presence of his 
lawyer.16 Next, police were able to determine that Dixon had sold Hammer’s car 
and arrested him for forgery.17 Officers chose not to provide Dixon with 
Miranda warnings at that time, fearing that he would refuse to speak to them 
about Hammer’s murder.18 During this unwarned interrogation, Dixon 
confessed to forgery.19 Police also attempted to elicit a murder confession by 
telling Dixon that his accomplice, Tim Hoffner, was about to reveal the 
involvement of both men in the killing, but Dixon avowed that he had 
“[n]othing whatsoever” to do with Hammer’s death.20 
After this interview concluded, Hoffner led police to where Hammer’s body 
was buried.21 Later that day, the police initiated a second interview with 
Dixon.22 Before any questioning began, Dixon told officers that he had spoken 
to his lawyer and now wished to confess to murdering Hammer.23 Dixon was 
read his Miranda rights, and he signed a waiver of those rights before providing 
police with a detailed confession.24 
 
 9. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467–73. 
 10. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22, § 2(a) (West 2013). 
 11. Id. §§ 2–3. 
 12. Bobby v. Dixon, 132 S. Ct. 26 (2011) (per curiam). 
 13. Id. at 27; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006). 
 14. Dixon, 132 S. Ct. at 27. 
 15. Id. at 28. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
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At trial, Dixon argued that his murder confession should be suppressed.25 
Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court found that Dixon’s confession was 
admissible because, under Oregon v. Elstad,26 a suspect who initially responded to 
unwarned but uncoercive questioning can waive his rights and confess at a 
subsequent interrogation after he has been given the proper Miranda warnings.27 
Dixon then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that the Ohio 
Supreme Court’s decision “contravened clearly established federal law.”28 A 
divided panel of the Sixth Circuit agreed with Dixon and granted him the 
requested relief.29 
The Supreme Court, in reviewing the Sixth Circuit’s decision, stated that a 
federal court only has authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus under AEDPA 
when a state court decision is “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 
application of, clearly established Federal law.”30 The Court addressed each of 
the “errors” in the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision that the Sixth Circuit 
identified as egregious and concluded that none of them rose to that exacting 
standard.31 First, the Sixth Circuit had indicated that admitting Dixon’s murder 
confession was egregious error because Dixon had previously refused to answer 
the police’s questions before he had been arrested on the forgery charge.32 The 
Supreme Court indicated that this could not possibly be error because an 
individual cannot invoke his Miranda rights anticipatorily in a context other 
than custodial interrogation.33 Second, the Sixth Circuit held that police 
violated Dixon’s rights by urging him to “cut a deal” before his accomplice Tim 
Hoffner revealed their involvement in Hammer’s murder.34 The Supreme Court 
held that this could not be error, either, because “the Court [had previously] 
refused to find that a defendant who confesses, after being falsely told that his 
codefendant” had provided the State with evidence, had made an involuntary 
confession.35 
Third, the Sixth Circuit held that the Ohio Supreme Court had unreasonably 
applied Oregon v. Elstad to this case.36 In Elstad, a suspect who had not received 
Miranda warnings confessed to a burglary.37 About an hour later, the suspect 
received his Miranda warnings and made a second confession regarding the same 
offense.38 The Supreme Court held that the later, warned confession was 
admissible because it had been voluntarily made.39 In this case, however, the 
 
 25. Id. at 28–29. 
 26. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985). 
 27. Dixon, 132 S. Ct. at 29. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011). 
 31. Id. at 29–32. 
 32. Id. at 29. 
 33. Id. (citing McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 182 n.3 (1991); Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 
U.S. 778, 795 (2009)). 
 34. Id. at 29–30. 
 35. Id. (quoting Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 317 (1985)). 
 36. Id. at 30. 
 37. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 301. 
 38. Id. at 301–02. 
 39. Id. at 318. 
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Sixth Circuit held that Dixon’s confession was not voluntary because it was the 
product of a “question-first, warn-later strategy” like that addressed by the 
Supreme Court in Missouri v. Seibert.40 In Seibert, police used a two-step strategy 
to reduce the effect of Miranda warnings: a suspect was questioned until she 
confessed, and then, after a short break, Miranda warnings were provided and 
the suspect was asked to repeat the prior confession.41 The Court held that this 
tactic could not produce an admissible confession because a suspect could not 
think he had a genuine right to remain silent based on the answers he had 
already given to the prior questioning.42 
The Sixth Circuit believed that the voluntariness of Dixon’s confession in this 
case was obliterated by his prior, unwarned confession to the forgery offense.43 
The Supreme Court, however, disagreed.44 First, it reasoned, there was no 
indication that either of Dixon’s confessions were given involuntarily.45 And 
second, Dixon’s confession to murder was not at all like the involuntary 
confession in Seibert where police asked the suspect to repeat her prior 
confession after providing Miranda warnings.46 In this case, Dixon denied 
involvement in Hammer’s murder in his first confession.47 As a result, police 
could neither have had Dixon repeat an earlier murder confession, nor could 
they have used the first confession to coerce the later one.48 
Dixon serves to reaffirm the Supreme Court’s commitment to the principles of 
Miranda and Elstad.49 Police must notify suspects of their Fifth Amendment 
rights before commencing a custodial interrogation.50 However, an unwarned 
confession does not automatically destroy the possibility that a subsequent, 
properly-warned confession will be admissible in court.51 So long as the 
subsequent confession is voluntary and not the product of a coercive “question-
first, warn-later” strategy, it will satisfy the safeguards of the Fifth Amendment.52 
2.  Howes v. Fields 
Miranda v. Arizona was designed to protect suspects from the “inherently 
compelling pressures of custodial interrogation.”53 This underlying purpose of 
the Miranda safeguards has frequently led the Supreme Court to address the 
circumstances in which a suspect is considered to be in “custody” and therefore 
deserving of a recitation of his rights.54 In Howes v. Fields, the Court examined 
 
 40. Dixon, 132 S. Ct. at 30–31; Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004). 
 41. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 604–06. 
 42. Id. at 613. 
 43. Dixon, 132 S. Ct. at 30–31. 
 44. Id. at 32. 
 45. Id. at 30. 
 46. Id. at 31. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 30–31. 
 49. See id. at 30–32. 
 50. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467–70 (1966). 
 51. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 317 (1985). 
 52. See id.; Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 613 (2004). 
 53. Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 103 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467). 
 54. Howes v. Fields, 132 S. Ct. 1181, 1189 (2012). 
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whether an inmate, incarcerated for a separate offense, is considered in 
“custody” when he is questioned by law enforcement about his involvement in 
another criminal transaction.55 
Randall Fields was serving a sentence in a Michigan jail when law 
enforcement officers removed him from the general prison population and 
brought him to a conference room where officers questioned him about sexual 
involvement with a minor he was alleged to have committed prior to his 
incarceration.56 Fields was never given Miranda warnings, but he was not 
handcuffed during the interview, and he was told several times that he was free 
to leave at any point.57 Fields later testified that he informed the officers several 
times during the interview that he no longer wished to speak with them, but he 
at no point specifically asked to be returned to his cell.58 He eventually 
confessed to the officers that he did have sexual relations with the minor.59 
At trial, Fields argued that his confession should be suppressed.60 The trial 
judge ruled that he had not been in custody for purposes of Miranda during the 
interview, and thus no Miranda warnings were required.61 On appeal, the 
Michigan Supreme Court denied discretionary review.62 Fields next filed a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court, which granted 
relief.63 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that clearly 
established federal law required Miranda warnings to be given when an inmate is 
removed from the general prison population and questioned about conduct 
occurring outside the prison environment.64 
The Supreme Court disagreed. First, the Court explained that under the 
AEDPA, no “clearly established federal law” required Miranda warnings in a 
prison setting; indeed, the Court had recently declined to adopt such a bright-
line rule.65 As a result, habeas relief was not warranted.66 Second, the Court 
indicated that Fields’s interrogation was not custodial.67 Simply because a 
suspect’s freedom of movement is restricted does not automatically mean that 
the suspect is in custody for Miranda purposes.68 The real inquiry is “whether 
the relevant environment presents the same inherently coercive pressures as the 
type of station house questioning at issue in Miranda.”69 The Court outlined 
 
 55. Id. at 1186–87. 
 56. Id. at 1185. 
 57. Id. at 1186. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 1186–87; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006) (stating that habeas relief may be 
granted if a state-court adjudication is the result of a “decision that was contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court 
of the United States.”). 
 65. Howes, 132 S. Ct. at 1187–88 (citing Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 112 (2010)). 
 66. Id. at 1187–89. 
 67. Id. at 1194. 
 68. Id. at 1189. 
 69. Id. at 1190 (citing Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 112). 
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three reasons why imprisonment alone is not considered “custody” for Miranda 
purposes: 
(1) questioning a person who is already in prison does not involve the 
shock that accompanies arrest; 
(2) an inmate is unlikely to be lured into a confession because of his 
desire for a prompt release; and 
(3) an inmate knows that law enforcement officers “lack the authority to 
affect the duration of his sentence.”70 
Based on these factors and the undisputed fact that Fields was told that he 
was free to end the questioning and return to his cell at any time, the Court 
concluded that Fields was not in custody within the meaning of Miranda.71 
The Court’s holding in Howes lessens the responsibility of officers to provide 
already-incarcerated suspects a recitation of their Fifth Amendment rights.72 So 
long as an inmate is assured that he is free to end the interview and return to his 
cell at any time, it seems that officers need not provide Miranda warnings.73 The 
Court’s decision, however, leaves ambiguous the question of when exactly 
Miranda warnings would be required within a prison setting.74 Justice Ginsberg, 
in a dissenting opinion, pointed out that Fields told officers more than once 
that he did not want to speak with them anymore, yet officers never terminated 
the interview or returned Fields to his cell.75 The majority in Howes never 
addressed how Fields’s statements affected their conclusion that the 
interrogation was non-custodial, and thus it is possible that such an interview 
would only be deemed “custodial” if the inmate specifically requested to be 
returned to his cell and officers instead refused and continued interrogating 
him.76 
3.  Elizondo v. State 
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals addressed under what circumstances 
non-law enforcement officers are required to give Miranda warnings in Elizondo 
v. State.77 In this case, Becky Elizondo was caught shoplifting clothing from an 
Old Navy store and was asked to read and sign a “civil demand notice” by the 
store’s loss-prevention officer.78 Elizondo signed the notice which was an 
admission that she had stolen merchandise.79 She later argued that the notice 
should be suppressed based on the theory that the officer should have given her 
Miranda warnings because he was engaged in an agency relationship with law 
enforcement.80 
 
 70. Id. at 1190–91. 
 71. Id. at 1194. 
 72. See id. 
 73. See id. at 1193. 
 74. See id. at 1193–94. 
 75. Id. at 1195 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). 
 76. See id. 
 77. Elizondo v. State, 382 S.W.3d 389, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
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Previously, the Court had determined that Miranda warnings were required 
when the interviewer was acting as an instrumentality of the State and fashioned 
three factors that courts should consider in making that determination.81 In this 
case, the Court acknowledged that “private citizens, even security guards, are not 
ordinarily considered ‘law enforcement officers,’” and stated that Elizondo had 
the burden to prove that the loss-prevention officer was acting as an agent of law 
enforcement when he interviewed her.82 Ultimately, the Court concluded that 
the loss-prevention officer was not an agent of law enforcement.83 There was no 
indication that police relied upon the officer’s notice as evidence or even asked 
to use it as such.84 The officer’s reason for obtaining the notice was to adhere to 
the policies of his employer, rather than for purposes of prosecution.85 And 
nothing in the record indicated that Elizondo believed that the officer was 
acting as an agent of law enforcement at the time of the interview.86 Because no 
factor indicated an agency relationship, the loss-prevention officer was not 
deemed to be an agent of law-enforcement officials.87 
Elizondo served to reinforce the principles the Court had already set forth in 
determining whether a private citizen acts as an agent of law enforcement for 
Miranda-warning purposes.88 Defendants will have to be careful to establish 
some link between the private party and police or prosecution if they wish to 
establish such a relationship.89 When the State does not use the confession 
obtained by the private party as evidence, it will be difficult for a defendant to 
prove that the agency relationship existed at the time of the interview.90 
4.  Alford v. State 
The Court of Criminal Appeals considered an exception to Miranda in Alford 
v. State.91 In Pennsylvania v. Muniz, a four-justice plurality of the United States 
Supreme Court recognized that Miranda warnings need not be given prior to 
custodial interrogation when police were merely asking questions necessary to 
secure biographical data used to complete booking or pretrial services.92 The 
Supreme Court reasoned that such questions are asked for “record-keeping 
purposes only” and do not implicate the Fifth Amendment concerns at issue in 
Miranda.93 The Court of Criminal Appeals subsequently adopted this 
exception,94 and the details of its application were brought before the Court in 
 
 81. Wilkerson v. State, 173 S.W.3d 521, 530–31 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (stating that the 
factors are (1) “the relationship between the police and the potential police agent;” (2) “the 
interviewer’s actions and perceptions;” and (3) “the defendant’s perceptions of the encounter”). 
 82. Elizondo, 382 S.W.3d at 394–95. 
 83. Id. at 396. 
 84. Id. at 395. 
 85. .Id. 
 86. Id. at 396. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See id. at 390–91. 
 89. See id. at 395. 
 90. See id. at 396. 
 91. Alford v. State, 358 S.W.3d 647, 649–50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). 
 92. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 600–02 (1990) (plurality opinion). 
 93. Id. at 601–02. 
 94. See Cross v. State, 144 S.W.3d 521, 524 n.5 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). 
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Alford.95 
Alford was arrested for resisting arrest and was taken to jail.96 After transport, 
police searched the back seat of the patrol car pursuant to department procedure 
and discovered a computer flash drive hidden under the seat.97 While Alford 
was being booked by jail facility personnel, he was asked what the flash drive was 
and whether it belonged to him.98 Alford responded that the item was a 
“memory drive” and that it did belong to him.99 At this point, Alford had not 
been provided with Miranda warnings.100 The flash drive was placed with 
Alford’s personal property for safekeeping.101 Alford later filed a pretrial motion 
to suppress the statements he made to the booking officer.102 
The Court of Criminal Appeals recognized that Alford was in custody when 
he answered these questions, but concluded that his statements were admissible 
because they fell under the Muniz “booking-question exception” to Miranda.103 
Because courts across the nation hold divergent views as to the scope of this 
exception, the Court elaborated that, “in deciding the admissibility of a 
statement under th[is] exception, a trial court must determine whether the 
question reasonably relates to a legitimate administrative concern, applying an 
objective standard.”104 This analysis is not affected by whether the questioning 
officer knows or should know that the answers provided will be incriminating.105 
In this case, because the flash drive was immediately placed with Alford’s 
personal property for safekeeping, the totality of the circumstances objectively 
showed that the officer’s questions were reasonably related to a legitimate 
administrative concern and thus fell within the exception.106 The holding in 
Alford gives officers significant leeway in asking unwarned questions pursuant to 
administrative procedures such as booking.107 However, the Court has yet to 
address other significant issues relating to the “booking-question exception,” 
such as whether safety concerns in a jail setting allow officers to question new 
inmates about gang affiliation.108 
B.  PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 
The Fifth Amendment’s general protection against being compelled in any 
 
 95. Alford, 358 S.W.3d at 647. 
 96. Id. at 650. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 650–51. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 651. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 662. 
 104. Id. at 659–60. 
 105. Id. (reasoning that to hold otherwise would render the exception a nullity, as any kind of 
police questioning would be subject to a “should-have-known” test). 
 106. Id. at 662. 
 107. See id. 
 108. See, e.g., Ramirez v. State, No. AP-75167, 2007 WL 4375936, at *15 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 
12, 2007) (not designated for publication) (holding that questions regarding gang affiliation during 
the booking process were admissible under the booking-question exception); Pierce v. State, 234 
S.W.3d 265, 272 (Tex. App.—Waco 2007, pet. ref’d) (reaching the same holding as Ramirez). 
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criminal case to be a witness against oneself—termed the privilege against self-
incrimination—prohibits forced testimony that falls properly within its scope.109 
For example, the State may not comment on a defendant’s refusal to testify at 
trial,110 or revoke probation solely because of the legitimate exercise of a Fifth 
Amendment privilege.111 However, a defendant’s silence prior to custodial arrest 
does not receive such stringent protections.112 Specifically, the Supreme Court 
has held that a suspect who wishes to enjoy Fifth Amendment protection of his 
refusal to respond to police questioning before he has received his Miranda 
warnings must affirmatively claim that protection.113 
1.  Salinas v. Texas 
In Salinas v. Texas, the Court of Criminal Appeals and the United States 
Supreme Court addressed the requirement that a suspect must affirmatively 
assert his rights prior to receiving his Miranda warnings in order to enjoy Fifth 
Amendment protections.114 In Salinas, two brothers were shot and killed in their 
home and police found six shotgun shell casings at the scene.115 The 
investigation led officers to Genovevo Salinas, who agreed to hand over his 
shotgun for ballistics testing and voluntarily accompanied officers to the police 
station for questioning.116 At the station, Salinas answered questions freely until 
he was asked whether his shotgun would match the shells recovered at the 
scene.117 At that point, Salinas said nothing but exhibited distinct signs of 
nervousness.118 After a few moments of silence, police began asking different 
questions, which Salinas answered.119 
At trial, prosecutors used Salinas’s reaction to the officers’ question as 
evidence of his guilt.120 He was found guilty, and on appeal, argued that this use 
of his silence violated the Fifth Amendment.121 The Court of Criminal Appeals 
rejected Salinas’s claim.122 The court held that while the Fifth Amendment 
protected defendants against compelled self-incrimination, Salinas’s pre-arrest, 
pre-Miranda interactions with police were not compelled.123 Thus, the Fifth 
Amendment’s safeguards could not apply to a suspect’s decision to remain silent 
 
 109. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 427 (1984). 
 110. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965). 
 111. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 438. 
 112. Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 607 (1982) (finding no Fifth Amendment violation when 
defendant who choose to testify was cross-examined regarding his post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence); 
Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 240–41 (1980) (no violation for cross-examination regarding 
pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence). 
 113. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 425 (citing United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 427 (1943)). 
 114. Salinas v. State, 369 S.W.3d 176, 178 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 
2174, 2179 (2013) (plurality opinion). 
 115. Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2178. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 2177–78. 
 121. Id. at 2178. 
 122. Salinas v. State, 369 S.W.3d 176, 179 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). 
 123. Id. 
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when he is under no official compulsion to speak.124 
The Supreme Court granted Salinas’s petition for certiorari.125 Ultimately, 
the Court agreed with the Court of Criminal Appeals that a suspect must assert 
his privilege against self-incrimination in order to benefit from it in the context 
of a pre-arrest, pre-Miranda questioning.126 The Court stated that the 
requirement that a suspect affirmatively assert the privilege has two exceptions: 
(1) that a criminal defendant need not take the stand to assert the 
privilege at trial; and 
(2) that a witness’s failure to invoke the privilege is excused where 
governmental coercion rendered that failure involuntary.127 
In this case, it could not be said that Salinas’s failure to invoke his privilege 
was due to governmental coercion because it was undisputed that his interview 
with police was voluntary.128 
The Court also declined to create a new exception for cases in which a 
suspect stands mute and thereby declines to give an answer police suspect would 
be incriminating.129 It indicated that such a rule would go against its precedent, 
which indicated that a defendant normally cannot invoke the privilege by 
remaining silent and would also unduly burden the government’s ability to 
prosecute criminal activity.130 The Court reinforced the fact that the 
requirement to affirmatively assert the privilege is not difficult to apply and 
avoids needless inquiries into what kind of conduct constitutes “silence” for 
Fifth Amendment purposes.131 
The Salinas case provides prosecutors with a powerful tool: they may freely 
comment on a defendant’s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence if such a refusal to 
answer a question was in the context of a voluntary, non-coercive interview with 
police.132 But as the dissent notes, this decision does not specifically state what is 
required of a suspect in order for him to assert his right against self-
incrimination.133 Must he mention the Fifth Amendment or his right to silence 
by name, or would simply asking to change the subject or end the interview 
suffice?134 This question is likely one that will come before courts in the near 
future. 
2.  Dansby v. State 
In Dansby v. State, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals considered the 
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privilege against self-incrimination in the context of conditions of probation.135 
Michael Dansby was placed on deferred adjudication community supervision for 
the offense of indecency with a child.136 As part of his conditions of probation, 
he was ordered to attend a sex offender treatment program and submit to 
polygraph examinations.137 Eventually, he was required to submit to a sexual 
history polygraph, and when he refused to answer questions about extraneous 
prior sexual offenses, Dansby was discharged from the program.138 The State 
filed a motion to adjudicate alleging that Dansby had failed to obtain the sexual 
history polygraph and failed to attend and successfully complete the treatment 
program.139 The trial judge granted the State’s motion over Dansby’s objection 
that the motion to adjudicate amounted to an unconstitutional penalty on his 
invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights.140 
The Court of Criminal Appeals agreed that Dansby’s probation had been 
revoked on the basis of his refusal to answer incriminating questions during the 
polygraph test and during sex offender group therapy sessions.141 The court of 
appeals had attempted to avoid the constitutional issue by holding that Dansby’s 
revocation could have been based solely on his failure to successfully complete 
the treatment program.142 The Court of Criminal Appeals, however, indicated 
that such an issue may be avoided only “if the violation upon which the 
reviewing court relies to uphold the trial court’s ruling is itself unquestionably 
free of constitutional taint”—and in this case, there was a very strong inference 
that Dansby’s unwillingness to incriminate himself was the deciding factor that 
led to his discharge.143 The Court stated that the record “strongly suggest[ed]” 
that if Dansby had agreed to return to treatment and take the sexual history 
polygraph, the motion to revoke would have been dismissed, and Dansby’s 
supervisors had certainly never testified that Dansby would have been discharged 
regardless of whether or not he had invoked his Fifth Amendment rights.144 
The new “constitutional infection theory” that the Court fashioned in Dansby 
serves as an exception to the rule that an appellate court is entitled to rely on a 
single violation in affirming a revocation of community supervision.145 However, 
as the dissent points out, the Court’s inquiry into the reasons behind Dansby’s 
discharge from the treatment program—essentially an analysis of the subjective 
intent of Dansby’s supervisors—may ultimately dilute the abuse-of-discretion 
standard that has long been the standard of review for a trial judge’s revocation 
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of probation.146 It may be possible to reconcile Dansby with prior cases by 
reasoning that the Court essentially held that the trial judge abused his 
discretion when he revoked Dansby’s probation when the evidence strongly 
suggested that the motion had been filed in response to Dansby’s assertion of 
his Fifth Amendment rights.147 But this is not clear from the Court’s bottom 
line.148 In any case, to successfully sidestep a probationer’s constitutional claim 
of error, prosecutors will now have to be able to prove that at least one ground 
of a motion to revoke probation is wholly untainted by the constitutional 
issue.149 
III.  SEARCHES AND SEIZURES 
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that “[t]he right of 
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation.”150 At its 
most basic level, the Fourth Amendment protects individuals against 
unreasonable governmental intrusions.151 To qualify for these constitutional 
protections, an individual must have standing to challenge an unreasonable 
search or seizure: first, they must prove that the actor conducting the intrusion 
was a governmental agent;152 and second, they must prove that they had both “a 
subjective expectation of privacy” in the person, place, or thing being searched 
and that society would be prepared to accept that expectation as reasonable.153 
A.  PROPERTY-BASED FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has undergone something of a sea change 
in the last two years. Since 1967, when the United States Supreme Court 
decided Katz v. United States, a determination of whether a government search 
violated the Fourth Amendment revolved around whether an individual enjoyed 
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a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in the space searched.154 This analysis was 
predicated upon the principle that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, 
not places.”155 But before that decision, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was 
tied to common-law trespass and was based on whether the space searched was 
constitutionally protected because of an individual’s property interest therein.156 
Recently, in United States v. Jones and Florida v. Jardines, the Supreme Court 
announced that the Katz privacy-based model had not supplanted the earlier 
property-based model, and that the two models coexist as alternate means of 
determining whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred.157 
In Jones, the FBI began investigating Antoine Jones in order to determine 
whether he was trafficking in narcotics.158 Agents obtained a warrant to apply an 
electronic tracking device to Jones’s vehicle within ten days and only in the 
District of Columbia.159 On the eleventh day, and not in the District of 
Columbia but in Maryland, agents installed the device on Jones’s vehicle and 
began to track his movements.160 In part because of the evidence obtained 
therefrom, Jones was indicted for multiple drug trafficking offenses.161 Jones 
challenged the evidence gleaned from the tracking device, claiming it was 
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.162 
The Supreme Court held that, on a very basic level, the Fourth Amendment 
protected “persons, houses, papers, and effects” from unreasonable searches, 
and that a vehicle was unquestionably an “effect” as stated in the 
Amendment.163 As such, the government’s installation of a tracking device on 
Jones’s vehicle and the subsequent use of that device to track the vehicle’s 
movements was a Fourth Amendment search.164 The government, employing 
the Katz privacy-based model, argued that the search, although not executed 
pursuant to a valid warrant, was valid because Jones had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the exterior of his vehicle accessed by agents, as those 
parts were clearly visible to the public.165 However, the Supreme Court indicated 
that simply because a search was reasonable under the privacy-based model did 
not mean that it was also reasonable under the property-based model: “[W]e [do 
not] believe that Katz, by holding that the Fourth Amendment protects persons 
and their private conversations, was intended to withdraw any of the protection 
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which the Amendment extends.”166 As such, the government’s warrantless 
intrusion upon Jones’s constitutionally protected property violated the Fourth 
Amendment.167 
Florida v. Jardines afforded the Court another opportunity to reinforce the 
mutual coexistence of the privacy-based and property-based models.168 In 
Jardines, police received an unverified tip that Jardines was growing marijuana 
inside his home.169 Officers brought a drug-sniffing dog to Jardines’s front 
porch, and the dog signaled to his handler that he detected the smell of drugs 
emanating from the house.170 On the basis of the dog’s performance, officers 
obtained and executed a search warrant for the home.171 Marijuana was found 
inside, and Jardines was charged with a drug trafficking offense.172 At trial, 
Jardines moved to suppress the drug evidence on the basis that the canine 
investigation was an unreasonable search.173 
In deciding the case, the Supreme Court reiterated the principles it laid out 
in Jones: that the Fourth Amendment protects against the government’s physical 
intrusion into constitutionally protected areas;174 that the home is the area 
where an individual’s privacy expectations are the most heightened;175 and that a 
decision in this case could be made on the basis of the property model alone, 
because that model coexists with the Katz privacy-based model.176 The Court 
also reasoned that property-based protections would be of little value if 
government agents could intrude upon the areas in close proximity to the house 
with impunity, and therefore not only the house but its “curtilage” is 
constitutionally protected by the Fourth Amendment.177 And because Jardines’s 
front porch was part of the “curtilage” associated with his home, the officers’ 
investigation took place in a constitutionally protected area.178 
Despite that fact, however, the canine investigation would only violate the 
Fourth Amendment if it constituted an unlicensed physical intrusion into the 
curtilage.179 After all, an officer “need not ‘shield [his] eyes’ when passing by the 
home ‘on public thoroughfares.’”180 The facts of Jardines stand in stark contrast 
to an officer casually observing a home in passing, however—it cannot be said 
that it is customary for an officer to perform a canine sniff on an individual’s 
front porch.181 As a result, the investigation was unlicensed and constituted an 
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unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.182 
The ramifications of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Jones and Jardines are 
far-reaching. Now, when courts and litigants analyze Fourth Amendment claims, 
they must determine whether an unreasonable search has occurred under both 
the privacy- and property-based models.183 An analysis under the property-based 
model is complicated by the fact that it is not always clear what property is 
protected by the Fourth Amendment. For example, lower courts—including 
Texas courts of appeals—have already begun to grapple with what exactly 
constitutes the “curtilage” of a home.184 Likewise, the Texas Court of Criminal 
Appeals took these developments into account when it remanded Rivas v. State, 
a case factually similar to Jardines, to the court of appeals for that court to 
consider the effect that Jardines had upon its outcome.185 
B.  GENERAL SCOPE OF FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION 
The general requirements of the Fourth Amendment, as indicated above, 
require that law enforcement officials obtain a warrant, predicated upon 
probable cause, before they are permitted to conduct a search or seize persons or 
property.186 However, the Supreme Court’s decisions indicate that applying this 
framework rigidly in every situation is unworkable.187 For example, under the 
Katz privacy-based model, police may freely search spaces in which an individual 
does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy.188 Additionally, officers have 
categorical authority to detain individuals incident to a lawful search, regardless 
of probable cause.189 Recently, the Supreme Court has elaborated upon a 
number of situations that are expansions upon the traditional framework. 
1.  Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Burlington 
The question of which constitutional rights are enjoyed by the inmates of jails 
and prisons is one that has been frequently tackled by the Supreme Court. For 
example, in Bell v. Wolfish, the Court held that the usual reasonable-expectation-
of-privacy framework used to determine standing to challenge a search under the 
Fourth Amendment was impossible to apply in the prison context,190 as “there is 
no mechanical way to determine whether intrusions on an inmate’s privacy are 
reasonable. . . . [Instead,] [t]he need for a particular search must be balanced 
against the resulting invasion of personal rights.”191 In that case, the Court 
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upheld a policy of requiring inmates to undergo a strip search after any contact 
visit with a person from outside the institution because the policy was based on 
considerations of prison safety and security.192 
Recently, the Court extended these principles in Florence v. Board of Chosen 
Freeholders of Burlington.193 In Florence, officers arrested Albert Florence after 
determining that he had an outstanding warrant in the police database and took 
him to the county jail.194 Jail procedures required every arrestee to submit to a 
strip search as part of the initial booking process.195 Florence was released the 
next day when it was determined that the warrant against him was not valid.196 
Outraged at the invasive search he had been forced to undergo, Florence sued 
the jail officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights.197 He argued that persons arrested for a minor 
offense should not be required to submit to a strip search.198 Such an invasive 
procedure should be reserved for inmates whom jail personnel suspected of 
concealing contraband.199 
In deciding the issue, the Supreme Court reiterated the principles of Bell, 
indicating that legitimate safety concerns in prisons require deference to 
corrections officials in establishing “reasonable search policies to detect and 
deter the possession of contraband.”200 The Court stated that the practice of 
strip searching in this case would be upheld unless there was “substantial 
evidence” indicating that prison officials’ preventative measures were 
“exaggerated.”201 It further reasoned that the offense for which an inmate was 
arrested, and even the inmate’s criminal history, are poor indicators of whether 
the inmate is in possession of contraband.202 Ultimately, the Court held that the 
strip search procedure acceptably balanced inmate privacy and the needs of the 
institution and that the search was not a violation of Florence’s constitutional 
rights.203 
2.  Maryland v. King 
In Maryland v. King, the Supreme Court addressed whether a cheek or 
“buccal” swab of the interior of a recently booked inmate’s mouth for DNA 
testing is an unreasonable search of the person.204 Alonzo King was arrested for 
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first- and second-degree assault, and during booking, jail personnel used a cheek 
swab to take a DNA sample from him pursuant to Maryland law.205 DNA testing 
revealed that King’s DNA profile matched that of a sample collected in an 
unsolved 2003 rape case.206 After being indicted for rape, King moved to 
suppress the cheek swab sample.207 
The Supreme Court, in deciding the question, first recognized that virtually 
any intrusion into the human body constitutes an “invasion of cherished 
personal security” and is subject to constitutional scrutiny.208 It stated, however, 
that in some circumstances, such as “special law enforcement needs,” Fourth 
Amendment protections could be satisfied if the search is reasonable in scope 
and in manner of execution.209 Identifying the cheek swab search as a situation 
where “reasonableness” should govern the issue, the Court indicated that strong 
governmental interests were served by such searches: 
(1) they provide police with a safe and accurate way to identify the 
persons they take into custody;210 
(2) they provide law enforcement with untainted information about 
inmates useful in maintaining the order and security of jails and 
prisons;211 and 
(3) they provide information regarding an inmate’s potential future 
dangerousness, which is helpful in determining whether an 
individual should be released on bail.212 
These compelling interests, the Court concluded, more than make up for 
whatever minimal intrusion into an inmate’s personal space a non-invasive 
cheek swab imposes.213 As a result, the Court held that the cheek swab search 
was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.214 
3.  Bailey v. United States 
The Supreme Court has also held that an individual may be detained without 
probable cause while officers are executing a valid search warrant of the premises 
in which the individual is located.215 In Michigan v. Summers, the Court indicated 
that such a detention is permissible because it constitutes only minimal 
intrusion on an individual’s privacy and compelling governmental interests in 
play during the execution of a warrant render such a seizure reasonable.216 
Recently, in Bailey v. United States, the Supreme Court addressed whether police 
are also permitted to detain individuals some distance away from the premises 
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searched.217 
Police had obtained a warrant to search a house for a handgun.218 Before the 
warrant was executed, officers observed a man, who matched the physical 
description of an individual associated with the firearm, leave the house in a 
vehicle.219 After the vehicle left the house, the warrant was executed, and the 
house was searched.220 However, officers also followed the vehicle, eventually 
pulled it over, and detained Chunon Bailey “incident to the execution of a 
search warrant.”221 Bailey was indicted for drug possession and possession of a 
firearm by a felon.222 At trial, he moved to suppress evidence derived from what 
he claimed was an unreasonable seizure.223 
The Supreme Court decided Bailey on the basis of whether the principles of 
Summers also justified detentions beyond the immediate vicinity of the premises 
being searched.224 The Court had identified three principal law enforcement 
interests in Summers that justified the detention of occupants of premises during 
a search: 
(1) officer safety during the search; 
(2) freedom from interference from the premises’ occupants; and 
(3) the prevention of flight should incriminating evidence be found.225 
The Court concluded that none of these interests are safeguarded when the 
individuals detained are physically remote from the premises being searched.226 
Because no “special law enforcement interests” were at stake in this case, Bailey’s 
seizure was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.227 The Court’s 
decision ensures that police will not be able to justify an individual’s detention 
based solely on the execution of a search warrant occurring elsewhere.228 
C.  REASONABLE SUSPICION AND PROBABLE CAUSE 
The Supreme Court, guided by the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, 
has created standards that govern how and when police may interact with 
citizens. “Casual encounters” are consensual interactions between individuals 
and police and do not implicate constitutional rights.229 A temporary, 
investigative detention—commonly called a “Terry stop”—is considered a seizure 
under the Fourth Amendment and is only justified if the officer has “reasonable 
suspicion” that the person detained is, has been, or soon will be engaged in 
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criminal activity.230 Finally, “probable cause” is required in many instances—for 
example: 
(1) when an officer makes a warrantless arrest;231 
(2) when an officer conducts the warrantless search of an automobile;232 
or 
(3) when an officer wishes to obtain a search or arrest warrant.233 
In the last two years, the Supreme Court and the Texas Court of Criminal 
Appeals have addressed under what circumstances probable cause and 
reasonable suspicion are found as well as how warrants should be properly 
issued. 
1.  Florida v. Harris 
In Florida v. Harris, the U.S. Supreme Court tackled the question of how a 
court should determine whether a canine investigation of an automobile 
provides probable cause sufficient to perform a warrantless search.234 In this 
case, an officer pulled over Clayton Harris’s automobile because it had an 
expired license plate.235 Harris was “visibly nervous,” and the officer asked for 
consent to search his vehicle.236 When Harris refused, the officer retrieved a dog 
trained to detect narcotics from his patrol car.237 The dog signaled to the officer 
that he detected narcotics in the vehicle, and the officer concluded that he had 
probable cause to search the vehicle.238 Harris was ultimately arrested when the 
officer discovered ingredients used to make methamphetamine in the vehicle.239 
Harris moved to suppress the drug evidence, arguing that the dog’s signal had 
not given the officer probable cause for a search.240 On appeal, the Florida 
Supreme Court agreed, holding that the mere fact that the dog had been trained 
and certified was insufficient to establish probable cause; instead, the State 
needed to present as evidence training and certification records, field 
performance records, the experience and training of the officer handling the 
dog, and any other objective evidence that bolstered the dog’s reliability.241 
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, and ultimately reversed the 
Florida Supreme Court’s decision.242 It reminded lower courts that the test for 
probable cause is merely whether the facts available to the investigating officer 
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would “warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief that contraband or 
evidence of a crime is present.”243 Rigid rules, bright-line tests, and finely tuned 
standards of proof have no place in the probable-cause inquiry.244 The Court 
stated that Florida’s test for a probable-cause determination in a canine-sniff case 
was overly formulaic, as it was “a strict evidentiary checklist, whose every item 
the State must tick off” to establish that an officer had probable cause to 
search.245 Instead, evidence of a dog’s satisfactory performance in a training 
program would be enough for an officer to trust his alert so long as a defendant 
had the opportunity to challenge the dog’s reliability with his own evidence.246 
In this case, because the State had established the dog’s successful training and 
proficiency in finding drugs, and because Harris had not rebutted that evidence, 
the officer in fact did have probable cause to conduct the warrantless search of 
Harris’s automobile based on the dog’s signal that drugs were contained in the 
vehicle.247 
2.  State v. Duarte 
In State v. Duarte, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals addressed whether a 
magistrate could find probable cause sufficient to issue a search warrant for a 
residence, based solely on information provided by a first-time informant who 
did so based on the expectation of leniency on his pending criminal charges.248 
In deciding the question, the Court reiterated that while the standard for 
finding probable cause sufficient for a search warrant was “nondemanding,” 
courts should also ensure that warrants are not being issued based on “bare 
conclusions alone.”249 A search warrant affidavit based largely on hearsay from a 
confidential informant should be corroborated by independent police work, 
because such informants, whose motives for cooperating with officers are often 
self-serving, cannot be presumed to be reliable.250 In this case, the vague, 
uncorroborated information provided by the first-time informant did not add 
up to probable cause.251 In the future, police will have to ensure that if a search 
warrant affidavit is largely based upon the statements of a first-time informant, 
the information relayed by the informant both specifically describes the criminal 
activity in question and is corroborated by independent police investigation.252 
3.  Arguellez v. State 
In Arguellez v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals qualified the ability of 
officers to conduct Terry stops based solely on an individual’s so-called 
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“suspicious activity” in public.253 Officers received a call indicating that a man 
was parked outside of a public pool, taking pictures of patrons wearing 
swimming attire.254 Feliz Arguellez, the photographer, was detained, asked to 
make a statement regarding his activities, and was ultimately indicted for the 
offense of improper photography.255 The Court of Criminal Appeals addressed 
the issue by analyzing whether officers had “specific, articulable facts that, when 
combined with rational inferences therefrom, le[]d [them] to reasonably 
conclude” that Arguellez had “engaged in criminal activity.”256 The Court 
indicated that the totality of the circumstances known to officers “was that an 
unknown male in a described vehicle was taking photographs at a public pool,” 
and that this by itself was not unusual, suspicious, or criminal.257 As a result, 
Arguellez’s detention was not based on reasonable suspicion and was invalid.258 
The Court’s decision seems to indicate that an officer cannot conduct a Terry 
stop when an individual has engaged in activity that is not by itself unusual but 
that under some circumstances could be criminal.259 To conduct the stop, he 
must instead have additional articulable facts that point firmly at the presence of 
criminal activity.260 But as the dissent points out, a reasonable suspicion 
determination typically does not require that the articulable facts relied upon by 
police be criminal acts in and of themselves.261 Thus, the Arguellez decision 
seems to have heightened the reasonable suspicion standard, although it is 
possible that the Court’s decision affects such a determination only in the 
context of facts similar to those in this case.262 
D.  EXCEPTIONS TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT 
The Supreme Court has frequently reiterated the principle that “searches 
conducted outside the judicial process”—in other words, warrantless searches—
“are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”263 However, the Court 
has also carved out situations where warrantless searches are deemed reasonable, 
but has always been careful to indicate that these exceptions are “specifically 
established and well-delineated” so as to provide proper guidance to law 
enforcement.264 Exceptions to the general warrant requirement include the 
following: 
(1) searches incident to arrest; 
(2) consent; 
 
 253. Arguellez v. State, 409 S.W.3d 657, 663–64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). 
 254. Id. at 659–60. 
 255. Id. at 660. 
 256. Id. at 663 (citing Castro v. State, 227 S.W.3d 737, 741 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)) (stating 
the “reasonable suspicion” framework necessary to justify an investigatory detention). 
 257. Id. at 664. 
 258. Id. 
 259. See id. at 663–664. 
 260. See id. at 663. 
 261. Id. at 665 (Keasler, J., dissenting). 
 262. See id. at 663–64 (majority opinion). 
 263. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 
(2009). 
 264. Gant, 556 U.S. at 338. 
2014] Criminal Procedure 123 
(3) inventory searches; and 
(4) the existence of exigent circumstances.265 
The Supreme Court and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals have addressed at 
least two of these exceptions in recent years. 
1.  Exigent Circumstances 
“One well-recognized exception” to the warrant requirement “applies when 
the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling 
that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment.”266 A number of situations may present an exigency that justifies 
an officer’s warrantless search, including: 
(1) the need to provide emergency assistance to an individual;267 
(2) engage in pursuit of a suspect;268 or 
(3) to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence.269 
In deciding whether an exigency exists to justify a warrantless search, a reviewing 
court looks to the totality of the circumstances, instead of applying any bright-
line rule.270 
In Missouri v. McNeely, the Supreme Court addressed whether an officer can 
use the exigency exception to justify a nonconsensual blood test after a drunk-
driving arrest, on the basis that if the blood test was not immediately performed, 
evidence would be “destroyed” through the natural metabolization of alcohol in 
the arrestee’s bloodstream.271 The Court ultimately concluded that the exigent-
circumstances exception could not justify such a significant intrusion into the 
arrestee’s body solely on the basis that natural bodily processes would in time 
dissipate potential evidence of the arrestee’s guilt.272 
The Court identified Schmerber v. California273 as the touchstone for deciding 
the issues in McNeely.274 In that case, the Court had permitted the exigent-
circumstances exception to justify a warrantless blood test because the arrestee 
had suffered injuries in an automobile accident and had to be taken to the 
hospital, which extended the delay necessary to appear before a magistrate to 
obtain a proper search warrant.275 The decision in Schmerber, the Court 
explained, was based on an analysis of the totality of the circumstances, which 
pointed towards a real exigency justifying a warrantless search.276 In this case, 
however, looking at the totality of the circumstances, there was no evidence that 
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the arresting officer “faced an emergency or unusual delay in securing a 
warrant.”277 Therefore, the warrantless search was not reasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment.278 
The McNeely decision is significant because it categorically rejected the 
proposition that an officer is per se permitted to conduct a warrantless blood test 
on a drunk-driving arrestee based on exigent circumstances.279 Instead, officers 
will have to be able to identify some other factor contributing to an exigency, 
such as the unavailability of a magistrate to issue a warrant, or an emergency 
situation such as the one in Schmerber.280 Additionally, in Texas, the McNeely 
case has raised another issue—whether the Texas implied consent statute, which 
authorizes police to obtain a blood or breath sample from an individual without 
a warrant and regardless of consent under particular circumstances, has been 
rendered unconstitutional by the Court’s decision.281 Defendants have argued 
that McNeely has rendered mandatory blood draws categorically 
unconstitutional.282 Texas courts of appeals have not accepted this argument, 
reasoning instead that McNeely dealt only with situations where a warrantless 
blood or breath specimen was justified by resort to exigent circumstances 
alone.283 It is likely that the Court of Criminal Appeals will deal with the 
question of the constitutionality of Texas’ implied consent statute in the near 
future. 
In Turrubiate v. State, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals again addressed 
whether a single factor can by itself justify a warrantless search based on exigent 
circumstances.284 Here, when a policeman knocked on the door of a home, 
Marcos Turrubiate cracked the door open, and the officer noticed a strong odor 
of marijuana coming from inside.285 Believing that the drugs would be destroyed 
if he left to obtain a warrant, the officer forcibly entered the home and 
ultimately arrested Turrubiate for drug possession.286 On appeal, Turrubiate 
argued that the exigent-circumstances exception could not justify the officer’s 
entry into his home because the officer’s search had been based on only two 
factors: the officer’s belief that Turrubiate possessed marijuana, and Turrubiate’s 
awareness of the officer’s presence at his home.287 
The Court of Criminal Appeals agreed.288 First, the Court identified five 
factors that had traditionally been applied by officers in determining whether 
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evidence might be destroyed or removed before they could obtain a search 
warrant.289 However, the Court analyzed these factors in light of the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kentucky v. King,290 and concluded that 
these factors “no longer adequately assist a court in determining whether the 
record shows an exigent circumstance.”291 The Supreme Court in King had 
directed courts to instead make an assessment of the record in determining 
whether the officer conducting the warrantless search “reasonably believed that 
the removal or destruction of evidence was imminent,” and the factors in the 
older test had gone beyond that simple analysis.292 
In this case, following the test from King, the circumstances did not indicate 
that destruction of evidence by Turrubiate was imminent.293 Although the 
officer had smelled marijuana in Turrubiate’s home, and Turrubiate had as a 
result known that the officer was “on his tail,” there was no proof of attempted 
or actual destruction of evidence.294 Lacking that evidence, an exigency based on 
the imminent destruction was invalid—the Court required proof “beyond mere 
knowledge of police presence and an odor of illegal narcotics.”295 This ruling is 
significant because the Court has precluded the possibility of a per se rule 
allowing warrantless searches of homes based solely on the odor of narcotics 
emanating therefrom.296 
2.  Consent to Search 
Another exception to the general warrant requirement is consent. A 
warrantless search is considered reasonable if law enforcement obtains the 
voluntary consent of an individual possessing authority over the space that is 
searched.297 Consent frequently arises in the context of searches of homes and 
automobiles. For homes, a person possessing authority might be the owner of 
the home, or an individual living in the home who shares common authority 
over property within.298 
In State v. Copeland, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals addressed consent 
to search in the context of automobiles.299 The question before the court was 
whether a passenger may disallow police to search a vehicle in a situation where 
the driver has already provided that consent.300 Police had pulled over a vehicle 
driven by Wayne Danish, who provided consent to search the car.301 However, 
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Shirley Copeland, a passenger in the vehicle, told officers that she was the owner 
of the vehicle and that she refused to provide consent.302 Officers then asked 
Danish for the second time if he consented to the search, and he affirmed.303 
Police searched the vehicle over Copeland’s objections, discovered narcotics, 
and arrested Copeland.304 
The Court identified that the principles that govern the case are those of 
“third-party consent”—situations where consent was not given by the defendant, 
but by another who possessed common authority over the space searched.305 For 
homes, third-party consent by a co-tenant is valid when the fellow tenant is 
absent when consent is given.306 Conversely, third-party consent is invalid when 
the fellow tenant is present and makes an express refusal of consent.307 
Copeland urged that these principles should be applicable to vehicles, as well, 
but the Court rejected this argument.308 Unlike homes, the Court reasoned, 
where there is no generally recognized “hierarchy” of co-tenants, society 
recognizes the driver of a vehicle as the individual with a superior right with 
respect to the safety and control of a vehicle.309 Unless circumstances indicate 
that a passenger actually retains control over the vehicle and its contents,310 
consent by the driver would be sufficient to justify a warrantless search as 
reasonable.311 
While the Court of Criminal Appeals did not ultimately decide the case on 
its merits, it seems likely that the consent to search was voluntarily given by 
Danish, and Copeland’s objections did not override that consent.312 According 
to a police license plate check, Danish was the registered owner, and Copeland 
never provided proof that she was a co-owner or otherwise maintained control 
over the vehicle.313 The Court’s decision indicates that the greater protection for 
homes provided by the U.S. Supreme Court in consent cases does not apply to 
vehicular consent cases in Texas.314 If a passenger-defendant wishes to revoke the 
driver’s consent, he will have to ensure that the officer knew about the 
passenger’s legitimate retention of possessory control over the vehicle.315 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Because the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals continues to analyze most 
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issues under the United States Constitution, the cases decided by the U.S. 
Supreme Court during this Survey period will have significant impact upon 
Texas law. The resurgent property-based model of searches in particular, as set 
forth by the Supreme Court in the Jones and Jardines cases, represents a sea 
change in the most basic aspects of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The 
Court of Criminal Appeals cases decided during the survey period present few 
major changes to established precedent, but they do serve to expand or elaborate 
upon existing law in the areas of confessions, searches and seizures. 
